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ABSTRACT 
The cornerstone of Dempster-Shafer therory is Dempster's rule and to use the 
theory it is essential to know when the rule is justified. This paper discusses, and 
attempts to clarify, this issue. It is also argued that Bayesian belief unctions do 
not fit well into the theory. It is suggested that belief unctions in Dempster-Shafer 
theory can be usefully viewed in terms of families of additive probability func- 
tions. A Monte-Carlo algorithm is described which can be used to greatly improve 
the complexity of the calculation of combined belief. 
KEYWORDS: Dempster-Shafer theory, Dempster's rule, Bayesian belief 
functions, lower probability, Monte-Carlo algorithms 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Glenn Shafer has done the field a great service by writing this clear 
overview, bringing together work from many sources. I disagree with very 
little of his paper; in this paper I aim to clarify some issues concerned with the 
justification and complexity of Dempster's rule. The terms "Dempster-Shafer 
theory" and "belief function theory" tend to be used interchangeably; here, 
though, I use "Dempster-Shafer theory" (abbreviated to DST) to refer to the 
theory of Shafer's (reinterpreting and building on Dempster's work) that 
involves combining independent items of evidence by representing each indi- 
vidually by a belief function and using Dempster's rule to combine these; the 
theory is justified in terms of probabilities, for example, Shafer's random 
codes canonical example. Belief functions, on the other hand, I take to be the 
study and application of the mathematical objects "belief functions," which as 
well as including Dempster-Shafer theory also include lower probability 
interpretations of belief functions, an approach taken, for example, by Kyburg 
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[1] and Fagin and Halpern [2]. Shafer (S.5) l distances his work (which I refer 
to as DST) from lower probability. However, the class of belief functions is an 
important subclass of lower probability functions that have nice properties 
when updated (Wasserman [37]; Fagin and Halpern [27]; Jaffray [4]) and so 
are certainly worthy of study in their own right. Here I will be discussing only 
Dempster-Shafer theory. 
The cornerstone of DST is Dempster's rule, and a fundamental question is, 
When is it valid to combine belief function representations of evidences with 
it? In Section 2, I express ome doubts over the probabilistic justifications of 
Dempster's rule and point out belief function representations of evidences for 
which the use of Dempster's rule is inappropriate. DST is often assumed to be 
a generalization of the Bayesian approach; in Section 3, I question this 
assumption, which I believe is the cause of much confusion about DST. I argue 
in Section 4 that belief functions even in DST can usefully be viewed as 
the infimum of certain sets of probability functions. Finally, in Section 5, I 
show how a Monte Carlo approach greatly improves the efficiency of the 
computation of belief. 
2. JUSTIFYING DEMPSTER'S RULE 
2.1. Dempster's Rule in Terms of Probabilities 
Take belief functions Bel I and Bel2 on frame T that are based on indepen- 
dent items of evidence. Each belief function Bell, i = 1, 2, is taken to be the 
extension of probability function Pi on a space S i via a compatibility function 2
Fi: S i ~ 2 r, meaning "for s~S i, if s is true then Fi(s) is also true." 
A natural way to combine these is to construct a probability function Pl2 on 
S 1 x S 2 and extend this to a belief function on T using the compatibility 
function F defined by I'(s l, s2) = Fl(Sl) N F2(s2). Dempster's rule amounts 
to setting Pl2 = pDS, where pDS is the normalized independent probability 
function: 
0 if P (s  I, s2) = O 
PDS(Sl' S2) = KP I (S l )P2(s2)  otherwise 
JThis paper is a reply to Glenn Shafer's paper in a previous issue of this Journal [Int. J. 
Approx. Reasoning 4(516), 323-362, 1990]. References to that paper herein are in the form S. 
x, where x is the Section number. 
21 prefer the term "compatibility function" to Dempster's term "multivalued mapping" 
because thinking of I' i as a single-valued mapping from S i to the Boolean algebra 2 r makes the 
generalization to arbitrary logics plainer. 
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where K is the normalization constant needed to ensure that the probabilities 
sum to 1. 
Dempster explains the choice of pDS by a two-stage process: first temporar- 
ily ignoring the information given by the compatibility function and using the 
independence of the evidences to set P12(sl, s2) = Pl (sOP2(s2) ,  and then 
conditioning on P(s 1, s2) being nonempty. Probability-based justifications of 
Dempster's rule tend to be based on this idea, for example, Shafer's witness 
and random codes canonical examples and that given by Ruspini [5]. 
The hard part to justify is the separation of the probabilistic information 
from the compatibility function. Suppose we decide to interpret a piece of 
evidence as meaning that the truth lies in { x 1, x2} with probability Pl, in 
{ X3,X4} with probability P2, and in { x 5, x 6, XT} with probability P3, leading 
to a belief function with those masses. To combine this with another, independ- 
ent, evidence using Dempster's rule, we (using Dempster's justification) have 
to separate the pj 's from the statements o which they relate--considering this 
evidence as an instantiation of a "generalized evidence," which means mes- 
sage My with probability pj,  j = 1, 2, 3, where the Mj's could be any 
statement, but in this particular case it happens that M~ is "the truth lies in 
{ x , ,  x2} , "  etc. 
This seems a peculiar way of thinking of such an evidence. Does it make 
sense to split the probabilities from the compatibility function: Do the pj's on 
their own mean anything? One could imagine judging the reliability of a 
witness without noticing what he is currently saying, but how could these py's 
have been judged without reference to the statements, when the My's could, 
for example, have turned out to be consonant? It seems that there has to be a 
mechanism behind the probabilistic aspects of the evidence quite separate from 
the messages themselves. 
Shafer has found an ingenious example where there is such a mechanism: his 
random codes canonical example. But this does not remove the main obstacle: 
To use this canonical example, one must compare one's evidence to a setup 
where the probability function has meaning independent of what the statements 
are. 
2.2. Justifying the Combination of Simple Support Functions 
Shafer's witness canonical example for the combination of a finite number of 
simple support functions eems a natural analogy for certain types of evidence, 
justifying the separation of the probabilities from the messages. 
Take two witnesses, and let E i be the event that witness i is reliable, 
i = 1,2, where witness i makes statement a i. Let S i = {El, ~Ei} ,  and let 
Pi = Pi(Ei) be our probability that witness i is reliable if we just know about 
witness i and not the other one. Another justification of Dempster's rule can be 
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given, not derived from Dempster's and not requiring the separation of 
probabilities from statements (Wilson [6]). 
We construct probability function P12 on S = S 1 x S 2, after hearing the 
statements of both witnesses. It seems natural to assume that hearing a new 
but unreliable witness does not affect our judgment of the reliability of the 
first witness, so (A) PI2(E1 I -~E2)= Pl(Ei), and also symmetrically 
P12(E21~EI) = P2(E2). In the case where the statements al and a 2 contra- 
dict each other, this leads to P~2 = pDS. 
If  the statements are not contradictory, we make assumption (B) that, since 
the second witness does not contradict he first, it should not change our 
opinion about the reliability of the first, so that P12(El) = Pl(E1). These 
assumptions then imply P~2 = pDS, thus leading to Dempster's rule. Assump- 
tions (A) and (B) generalize asily for the combination of a finite number of 
simple support functions. 
Though it is convenient to express this justification in terms of witnesses, it
is not necessary. It will apply whenever we have a set of evidences, where the 
ith one, when considered on its own, we interpret as meaning a; with 
probability Pi, and as being meaningless with probability 1 - Pi. 
In both this justification and Shafer's the statements a i can be of a very 
general form. They could, for example, be propositions in a temporal logic; all 
that is needed is a notion of when a set of statements is contradictory and when 
a proposition can be deduced from a set of statements. Dempster-Shafer 
theory in this way is thus a simple way of adding uncertainty to an arbitrary 
logic (Wilson [7]). 
2.3. Different Belief Function Representations of Evidence 
There are at least two ways in which a belief function can arise from an 
evidence e. 
1. The belief function describes the support that the evidence gives to 
different propositions; for example, an evidence that just gave moderate 
support to proposition a might be represented by a simple support 
function with focal element a of mass 0.5. This seems to be the way that 
Shafer thinks about belief functions; for example, Shafer [8]. 
2. Given a partition of the frame T specified by mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive sets X 1 . . . . .  X r, we judge, for j = 1 , . . . ,  r, the probabil- 
ity that scenario Xj is true given just evidence e; for example, let 
T = { w, y, z}, and after learning evidence e our probability in { x, y} 
is 0.9 and in z is 0.1. 
The same evidence could well lead to belief functions by both these 
approaches, and these generally will be quite different. Dempster's rule is 
inappropriate for the combination of belief functions arising from the second 
approach; in particular, Dempster's rule is not appropriate for pooling two 
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experts' prior Bayesian beliefs. For example, suppose we received another, 
independent, evidence e', perhaps the judgments of another expert, who 
happened to give the same information, so that Pr({ x, y} I e') = 0.9, Pr(zl  e') 
= 0.1. Dempster's rule would give Bel({z}) = PI({z}) = 0.012. But since 
Pr(z] e) = 0.1 and Pr(z] e3 = 0.1, it would seem much more reasonable to 
assume Pr(z I e, e0 = 0.1, leading to Bel({ z}) = PI({ z}) = 0.1. 
The problem here is not that there is a hidden dependency between the 
evidences; it is just that this type of belief function representation is not of 
the fight type for combination by Dempster's rule. The separation of proba- 
bilities from messages necessary for Dempster's and Shafer's justifications i  
inappropriate here. 
Type 2 includes some of the frequency-based belief functions mentioned by 
Shafer (S.8). It might be possible to combine these evidences using Dempster's 
rule by imagining that the prior distributions were estimates of long-run 
frequencies and considering each as evidence pointing toward what the correct 
frequency distribution is, though this seems artificial. 
Type 2 representation f evidence is a very natural way for a belief function 
to arise in practice and includes Bayesian priors. Bayesian belief functions in 
DST then do not generally correspond to Bayesian measures of belief. 
3. UPDATING A BAYESIAN PRIOR 
In the light of the previous discussion about Bayesian belief functions it is 
not surprising that another case where there are problems with Dempster's rule 
is when a Bayesian belief function that is meant o be representing a Bayesian 
prior is combined with another belief function representing new evidence. 
Dempster-Shafer theory is a theory for combining evidences; to use the 
theory we "decompose our evidence into two or more unrelated bodies of 
evidence, make probability judgments eparately on the basis of each of these 
bodies of evidence, and then combine these judgments by Dempster's rule" 
(Shafer [9, p. 324). This is contrasted by Williams [10] with the Bayesian 
theory where "nothing can normally be said about the effect of new evidence 
without reference to prior beliefs." There is a sense in which Dempster-Shafer 
theory models the evidence, whereas the Bayesian theory models someone's 
response to the evidence. 
Many view DST as a generalization of the Bayesian approach. The reason 
for this seems to be that if Po is a Bayesian belief function representing 
someone's prior beliefs and it is combined with another belief function Bel e 
representing new evidence , we get a Bayesian belief function Pe given by 
Pc(x) = Po ~ Bele({X}) = KPo(x) Ple({X}) 
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for normalization constant K (e.g., Dempster [11, p. 339], Shafer [8, p. 206], 
Pearl [12]). If we could ensure that, for all x, Pie( { x}) is proportional to the 
likelihoods P(elx, eo) that would be used in a Bayesian approach, then the 
belief function answer would be correct from a Bayesian perspective. Unfortu- 
nately, this is not generally possible; the fact that the bodies of evidence 
leading to the different belief functions must be unrelated means that the prior 
knowledge  o that gives rise to P0 cannot affect P1 e, whereas the Bayesian 
likelihoods P(e[ x, eo) can be crucially dependent on the prior knowledge 0. 
Dempster's rule requires that e o and e be independent in a particular sense, 
but Bayes' rule does not. 
Another problem is illustrated by the following example. Joe lives on a 
street with a large number (N)  of houses, and I wish to know which house he 
lives in. Let T = { 1 . . . . .  N} be the set of possible values of his house 
number. My prior knowledge (eo) about T is just the well-known fact that Joe 
had a free choice of which house to live in and chose randomly using a fair 
N-edged spinner. The single piece of new evidence  is the statement of our 
mutual friend Bob; he tells me that Joe lives in house 56. I judge that Bob is 
reliable 0.8 of the time and the rest of the time could say anything. My 
Bayesian prior is Po(J) = 1 /N  for house number j = 1 . . . . .  N. A sensible 
Bayesian approach will lead to a posterior probability of roughly 0.8 for house 
56. This corresponds to posterior odds of 4; the prior odds were 1/ (N  - 1), 
so the likelihood ratio, Pr(e [56)/Pr(e [{56}), is 4 (N  - 1). 
There are problems when we try to generalize this argument to Dempster- 
Shafer theory. We must construct a belief function Bel e that represents 
evidence . e in DST is represented by a simple support function with mass 
0.8 on the set {56}; but the combined Dempster-Shafer belief Po • Bele(56 ) 
is then 5/ (N  + 4), which is very small and does not correspond to the 
Bayesian answer. 
In order to get the correct posterior Bayesian belief, we must have (making 
the natural symmetry assumption) for j *: 56, Ple({56})/Ple({j}) = 4(N - 1) 
so that Ple({j }) -< 1/4(N - 1). Any such Bel e is an odd representation f the 
evidence (are the j ' s  really that implausible, should it really depend on N?), 
but in any case we would never have thought of picking such a Bel e without 
referring to e o and P0--and this we are not allowed to do because Bel e should 
be constructed from e, independently of e o and Po- The same problem with 
any other Po can be shown by changing the example so that Joe chose his 
house with a biased spinner. 
This problem arises because, in Dempster-Shafer theory, Bayesian belief 
functions relate to the very exceptional situation when "the evidence is both 
very conflicting and very specific" (Shafer [13, p. 328]); the uniform Bayesian 
belief function would correspond to, for example, N equally and extremely 
reliable witnesses Wj, j = 1 . . . . .  N, Wj saying that house j is the correct 
house (see Shafer [8, p. 202]). 
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4. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY AND LOWER PROBABILITY 
Shafer emphasizes the difference between a lower probability view of belief 
functions and a Dempster-Shafer view. However, it can still make sense to 
view a belief function as the lower bound for a set of probability measures 
even within DST. 
Let Bel be, as in Section 2.1, a combined belief function on finite frame T, 
the result of extending a probability function pDS on space S via a compatibil- 
ity function F. 
Suppose someone wanted to construct a probability function P on T to use 
in conjunction with a complete set of utilities, as part of a decision-making 
process. How could we guide them? We don't have a probability function on 
T, but we did construct pDS on S, which we believe summarizes our un- 
certain information. It is then reasonable that P should satisfy the constraints 
induced by pDS, 
For all X c_ T, P(X)>_ ~ pDS(s)[=Bel(X)] 
s: F(s)C_X 
that is, P e ~ where ~ is the class of compatible measures of Bel (Dempster 
[11]). 
Any choice of P (with associated ecision) satisfying these constraints is 
then consistent with our information; one can then consider upper and lower 
expected utility as suggested by Dempster and Kong [14]. Since Bel is the 
lower probability given the constraints induced by pDS, results from a lower 
probability view of belief functions carry across to DST, albeit with slightly 
different interpretation. 
Let e be the body of evidence upon which Bel was based. If a new piece of 
evidence ' is now received, then, given that we can come up with likelihoods 
Pr(e'Jx, e) for all xe  T, all Pe  ~ can be updated, and it is natural to 
consider the infimum P , (X J  e', e), for X _ T. It is shown by Wasserman 
[7] that this can be expressed neatly. 
where 
P, (X le ' ,  e) - 
Z = ~ m(B)I,(B) 
Bc_X 
Z 
(z + w) 
and W= E m( B)I*( B \ X) 
BgX 
m is the mass function associated with Bel, 
I,(B) = minPr(e' ] x ,  e) 
x~B 
and I*(B \ X )  = max Pr (e ' l x ,  e) 
x~B \ X 
(see also Wilson [15]). 
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If Bel were the combination using Dempster's rule of a number of belief 
functions, then P . (X le ' ,  e) could be calculated using a slightly modified 
version of the Monte Carlo algorithm given in Section 5. 
Some evidences can be better expressed in DST, some better in the Bayesian 
theory. This approach allows some mixing of Dempster-Shafer representation 
of evidence with Bayesian representation. It also leads to a way of adding prior 
information to a DST approach; in this case e' represents he prior knowledge. 
The conclusions may, however, be disappointingly weak--for example, if 
Bel(X) = 0, then P , (X  I e', e) will be 0 whatever e' is; also in practice the 
likelihoods Pr(e' I x, e) may be hard to assess. 
5. COMPUTATION OF BELIEF 
Shafer expresses fears about the computational complexity of Dempster's 
rule, pointing out that the number of nonzero masses will often increase very 
fast with repeated application of it. For example, the combination of m simple 
support functions gives a belief function that can have up to 2 m nonzero 
masses. Fortunately, it turns out that, for a given set X, Bel(X) can be 
calculated irectly using a Monte Carlo algorithm without first calculating the 
masses, and this calculation has very low complexity (Wilson [6, 7]). The use 
of Monte Carlo algorithms for calculating Dempster-Shafer belief has also 
been suggested by Pearl [16], Kiimpke [17], and Kreinovich and Borrett [18]. 
THE MONTE CARLO ALGORITHM FOR SIMPLE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS Given 
witnesses IV/, i = 1 . . . . .  m, each giving statement ai, let E i be the event hat 
I4~i is reliable, and let c~ i be the probability of E i. To calculate Bel(b), for 
some proposition b, a large number of trials are performed. For each trial: 
1. (a) For i=  1 . . . . .  m 
include i in tr with probability oLi; 
Let K ,  = { ai: i e a}, the randomly picked statements 
(b) If  Ko is contradictory then Restart rial; 
2. If  b can be deduced from Ko then trial succeeds, 
else trial fails. 
The proportion of trials that succeed then converges to Bel(b). 
This is a very general algorithm. The a /s  could be propositions in an arbitrary 
logic (though undecidability and semidecidability would cause problems). 
The algorithm can be adapted easily to deal with non-simple support 
functions by changing step la, making little difference to the time the algorithm 
takes. The algorithm can also be adapted to deal with other probabilty 
functions apart from pDS; for example, if we have extra probabilistic 
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dependencies about he Ei's in the form of a Bayesian etwork with the Ei's as  
nodes, then we could perform step 1 (picking o) by using a single trial of a 
simulation algorithm on the Bayesian etwork (Henrion [19]). 
The efficiency of this Monte Carlo algorithm arises from the fact that the 
number of completed trials necessary (N)  depends just on the accuracy 
required and not on the size of the problem. The proportion of trials that get 
restarted converges to K, a measure of the conflict of the evidences (see Shafer 
N 
[8, p. 65]). The time this algorithm takes is then approximately ~ (Am + 
R), where A is a constant (essentially the time to generate a random number) 
and R is the average time it takes to see if Ko is contradictory and if Ko 
allows b to be deduced. Given that the weight of conflict of the evidences i  
bounded, this means that the complexity is proportional to that of proof in the 
logic; it is hard to see how any sensible uncertainty calculus could do better 
than this (although DST may well have a large constant erm because many 
trials may be required to achieve sufficient accuracy). 
Take the classical case where there is a frame T and for each i, a i is a 
statement of the form "the truth lies in the set Ai"  for some A i _ T. In this 
case, step lb, testing if K~ is contradictory, and also step 2, can be done very 
easily because they only involve checking whether or not the intersection of 
m sets of size at most I TI is empty. The algorithm then takes roughly 
N 
- - (Am + B I TI) ,  for constant B, so the algorithm is linear in the 
1 -K  
number of evidences and the size of the frame. 
As Shafer points out [5.9]), [ T I will often be enormous. The algorithm can 
also be used to greatly improve the complexity of the algorithms for calculating 
belief in Markov trees (Shenoy and Sharer [20]). For each trial, propositions 
(i.e., belief functions with a single focal element) must be propagated through 
the Markov tree. The complexity is then proportional to that of propagating 
propositions rather than the whole belief functions. I have dealt elsewhere with 
some other propositional cases [6]. 
There are two drawbacks with the Monte Carlo algorithm. First, if very 
high accuracy is required, then the Monte Carlo algorithm will require a large 
number of trials (quadratic in the reciprocal of the accuracy), thus giving a 
very high constant factor to the complexity; and second, when the evidence is 
highly conflicting, the Monte Carlo algorithm loses some of its efficiency. I 
don't see this as a great problem because an extremely high weight of conflict 
would suggest, except in exceptional circumstances, that Dempster's rule is 
being applied when it is not valid, for example, to combine two experts' 
Bayesian priors. 
Also in [6], I describe an exact algorithm for calculating belief that involves 
expressing the event hat the evidences imply b as a Boolean expression i  the 
Ei's (the events that the witnesses are reliable) and then calculating the 
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probability of this using the laws of Boolean algebra. The complexity for the 
simple support function case appears to be approximately of the form [ T I log m. 
Timed experiments to test the efficiency of these algorithms have been 
carded out for the case of simple support functions on a frame of a manageable 
size, and the experiments confirmed the linearity of the complexity of the 
Monte Carlo algorithm. Assume, for purposes of comparison, that mass-based 
algorithms (i.e., algorithms that involve calculating the masses, such as the fast 
M6bius transform of Kennes and Smets [21]) take the same time as 2 q real 
multiplications, where q = min(m, I TI), and that r = 0.5 and N = 1000, 
sufficient for accuracy of +0.05. Then for m = [ T[ = 30, the Monte Carlo 
algorithm takes about 15 seconds, the exact algorithm mentioned takes about 3 
minutes, and the mass-based algorithm would take about a day. The Monte 
Carlo algorithm also manages to calculate belief in less than a minute for cases 
where the mass-based algorithm would take longer than the age of the 
universe. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Dempster's rule has strong justifications when used for combining a finite 
number of simple support functions, and to me the theory seems most intuitive 
then. I believe that one of the major contributions of A Mathematical Theory 
of Evidence was focusing on this subcase. The simple support function case 
allows a sound representation f rules and allows a measure of uncertainty to 
be added to arbitrary logics. To some extent he same justifications work for 
the combination of separable belief functions, but further canonical examples 
that justified Dempster's rule for a wider class of belief functions would 
certainly be useful, because it is hard to compare a piece of evidence to a 
randomly coded message. 
Bayesian belief functions do not seem to me to represent common types of 
evidence or correspond to Bayesian beliefs, and Dempster-Shafer theory 
appears not to be a generalization f the Bayesian theory; in particular, it is not 
clear when a Dempster-Shafer belief function can justifiably be used to update 
a Bayesian prior. Some prior knowledge about the relative likelihoods of 
singletons can be incorporated using the approach suggested in Section 4. 
The complexity of the calculation of combined belief using a Monte Carlo 
algorithm turns out to be remarkably low. 
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